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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a comprehensive theory of
industrial buying decisions. A theory, in general, serves any of these
functions: (.-) descriptive function by which it describes and narrates
a phenomenon with the use of a set of constructs, (b) delimiting function
by which it explicitly states the purpose of the theory and specifies
what it does not include, (c) integrative function by which it attempts
to reconcile a variety of findings and hypotheses by a network of constructs,
and finally (d) generative function which represents the extent to which
it provides speculation, inventiveness, and generates new ideas [53 .
Surprisingly, considerable empirical research on industrial buying
behavior already exists today [4, 6, 12, 13, 14] • Therefore, the first
two functions are already performed by others to a considerable extent.
However, the third and the fourth functions warrant some attention because
very little has been so far attempted to integrate existing camirical
evidence and research thinking in a manner which would encourage further
speculation and generate additional hypotheses.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE THEORY
After reviewing the existing knowledge on industrial buying behavior,
I have attempted to integrate various findings. Out of this integration
has resulted the theory of industrial buying decisions described in this
paper. I must, however, point out that what I am about to describe is as ye
only a theory, untested in its totality although several parts have

substantial empirical support. The theory is summarized in Figure 1.
If it looks quite similar to Howard-Sheth theory of buyer behavior C 5]
,
it is very true with respect to the format of the two theories and only
partly true with respect to both the theoretical constructs and their
network of relationships. Admittedly, the theory presented in this
paper is a complex aet of interactions among a large number of variables
and also among several individuals in the buying organizations. But
then industrial buying is indeed a complex process which mandates a
comparable theory.
.
I am indeed teopted to repeat my earlier viewpoint
9 in case someone finds the comprehensiveness of the theory unnecessary
or impractical: If we do not remain far-sighted to comprehend the totality
of the research area, we are liable to resemble the proverbial seven
blind men and the elephant.
One can, however, somewhat simplify the utilization of the theory
in a specific study in two ways. First, not all the constructs are
likely to be active at a point in time because a number of them are
temporally related to one another; several of them can be considered as
antecedent conditions to hold constant the differences among specific
decisions and arcong various decition-ruakers. Second, there are several
exogeneous constructs in the theory which can be abstracted further in
terms of more generalized factors. For example, the three constructs
related to organizational orientation, size, and structure can be
lumped into a single conetruct such as organizational style.
Before describing parts of the theory, it may be useful to provide
a brief overview. At a point in time, the industrial organization is
presumed to use a sec of products and services provided by other organi-
zations and individuals. The products-in-use can be classified into
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three broad categories: (1) Capital expenditure product! which are treated
as asset holdings, (2) consumables which become the raw materials. to the
company's own production of finished goods and (3) maintenance products
i
and services which provide essentially a support function to both the
man and the machine as productive agents in the organization. It is
presumed that the specific types and brands of products-in-use are the
result of a buying decision process in the organization which is either
autonomous to personnel from one department or joint among personnel from
at least the three departments of purchasing, production, and engineering*
It is critical to specify the determinants of joint vs. autonomous decision"
making in industrial buying behavior. The theory specifies that (1) there
are three exogeneous factors - organizational orientation, organization
size, and degree of centralization - which explain differences in joint
vs. autonomous decision-making among industrial organizations, and (2)
there are three other exogeneous factors - perceived risk, type of purchase
and time pressure - which explain difference across a variety of purchases
made by the same organization.
If a specific buying decision is autonomous, it is largely a function
of the person's expectations (attitude) about specific suppliers and their
brands. In addition, it is presumed that a number of situational factors
intervene between a person's expectations of a supplier and choice of
that supplier. These situational factors either facilitate or inhibit
the nice logical relationship between attitude and choice behavior. A
person's expectations are derived from the buying motives and his beliefs
about various suppliers in terms of their capability of satisfying these
buying motives. These three constructs - expectations, buying motives
and evaluative beliefs - are learned from four separate sources : s

4(1) First, the information available before and during the decision-
making process from a variety of sources including the mass media, and
word- of-mouth, as well as the cognitive processing of this information
so that it remains congruent with the individual's stored information;
(2) Second, the inter-departmental influences exerted by other department
personnel in the process of making purchase decisions; (3) Third, there
is the learning effect from past experiences of the individual as the
decision-maker, especially his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
specific suppliers and their products; finally (4) there are a number
of antecedent factors including the individual's personality life style
and role orientations which have exerted considerable influence in the
past to mould his cognitive world in a certain way. It is presumed that
the autonomous decision-maker, however, takes into account the specific
requests and preferences of other personnel to a more or less degree
depending upon his organizational position and de facto status he enjoys
among his peer groups.
Joint buying decisions in the industrial organizations are, by
definition, more complex, and generally they entail greater time intervals
between initiation and completion. Not only do they cause greater communication
and interaction among various departments, but also evoke inter-departmental
conflicts and their resolutions. The theory states that both the accessary
condition (felt need of joint decision-making) and the sufficient conditions
(differences in goals and perceptions among departments) are likely to be
prevalent in industrial organizations to entail conflict and its resolution
in several ways.
DESCRIPTION OF PARTS OF THE THEORY
Let me now describe the theory in detail. The following are meaningful

subpart* at which level it is easier to discuss the theory in greater depth:
(1) Individuals in the organization involved in buying decisions and their
cognitive world of buying motives, beliefs about the suppliers and
perceptual processes; (2) Determinants of autonomous vs. joint decision-
making process, and (3) process of joint decision-making with consequent
inter-group conflict and its resolution.
Cognitive World of Individuals in the Organization
Contrary to the popular belief, industrial buying decisions are not
solely in the hands of the purchasing agents [4, 8, 10]. Typically, one
finds that at least three departments are continuously involved in buying
decisions to a more or less degree. The theory classifies them as personnel
in the purchasing, engineering and production departments. The production
people are the end users of the products, engineering people set the
quality control standards and specifications, and the purchasing agents carry
out the process of procuring and buying the products in accordance with
the specifications and user requirements. There is typically a great deal
of interaction between these three departments, and often the buying
decisions are jointly made by them.
At a point in time, each person has a set of expectations (low or
high) about the products and suppliers of specific brands. These expect-
ations toward the same supplier or brand are presumed to be different
among the three parties because of differences in buying motives and
beliefs about suppliers among them. For example, in buying a machine
tool, the engineer may be looking for excellence in quality, the production
maaager may be seeking prompt delivery, proper installation, and service-
ability, but the purchasing agent may be looking for maximum price
advantage and other financial considerations. Furthermore, the evaluation

of a specific supplier such as Colchester or Alfred Herbert may he different
among these persons.
The differences in buying motives and beliefs about the products
i
and suppliers are themselves governed by three different factors* The
first relates to the individual decision-maker's background and orientations.
The theory specifies a total of three enogeneous variables to represent
this factor: personality, life style, and role orientation of the individual.
It is impossible to describe in this paper how each of these variables
influences a person's goals and perceptions. However, we may easily state
that it is these exogeneous variables which blend together wht '. the individ-
ual's personal motives and beliefs are and what he perceives them to be
as a corporate employee. In other words, the makeup of the individual
expressed in these variables will heavily influence his interpretation of
corporate goals and functions [11],
The second factor is the sources of information and communication
outside the organization. The bulk of this information is likely to be
from commercial sources although word-of-mouth communication among friends
and colleagues ie also likely to be common. Surprisingly, not all the
three parties have an equal opportunity to be exposed to the outside
information. It is a common knowledge that in many companies, the salesman
is not allowed to communicate directly with the engineer or the user of the
product. In general, accessibility of information is likely to be greater
with the purchasing agent. However, the user and the engineer may obtain
more objective information from their peer groups in other organizations.
Hot only are there differences in the quantity and type of Information
to which each party is likelr to be exposed, we also find that the processing
of information received also varies from individual to individual. This is

depicted by the perceptual bias construct in the model. Basically, it
represents the selective distortion and retention cf information received
which each individual goes through to establish cognitive consistency
i
between his existing knowledge an£ the new information. Finally, there
are likely to be substantial differences among the three persons with
respect to active search for information. It is hypothesized that active
search is left to the purchasing agent by the other two persons.
A distinct source of information is the actual experience of buying
and using the product. In view of the fact that this experience will vary
among the three parties, it is possible that the degree of satisfaction
each one derives from the same purchase decision will be different. This
is included Id the construct of satisfaction in the theory.
The third factor determining goals and beliefs of the three parties
is the internal interaction and communication among themselves. It would
seem that the purchasing agent is consciously influenced by the opinions
of the engineer and the user because of his relatively low status in the
organization [ 11]
.
Determinants of Autcnomona vs„ Joint Decision-Making
We know that not ail the industrial buying decisions are joint among
the three parties. There are several situations in which decision-making
is relegated to one of the parties, although, not necessarily to the
purchasing agent. In view of the fact that process of decision-making
is different between autonomous decisions and joint decisions at least
from the point of view of the supplier company, it is critical to identify
factors which determine whether a decision is likely to be joint or
autonomous.
The theory has isolated a total of six distinct exogeneous variables

8three of which are anchored to the characteristics of the product, and
the other three are anchored to the characteristics of the buying orga-
nization. One factor related to the product is the degree of perceived
risk involved [ 1] . The greater the perceived risk of making a wrong
decision the more will that decision tend to be joint rather than
autonomous. Typically, we find greater risks associated with capital expendi-
tures; however, there are a number of instances. in the consumables and
maintenance categories which are perceived to be m£ high rick. The
second factor is the type of purchase [33„ If the purchasing activity
is related to long-term planning and involved with capital esq ~ nditures
,
or if it is irrevocable, we would expect greater joint decision-making.
On the other hand, if it is repetitive, routine, and is related to ordering
consumables or maintenance items on a regular basis, the decision is likely
to be more autonomous [4]. Finally, if the purchase decision has to be
made under continued time pressure or in an emergency, it is likely to
be autonomous rather than joint decision.
The three factors related to the organization are its orientation,
its size and degree of centralization. If the organization is technology-
oriented, we hypothesize that the engineering department will dominate
and the decision will be mostly autonomous to the engineering people.
If it is production-oriented, the user will dominate and once again it
is likely to be autonomous. Second, if organization is very large, the
decision-making is likely to be joint among the three parties. Finally,
greater the degree of centralization in an organization less will be
the joint decision-making in buying decisions. Thus, a privately-owned
small company with technology or production orientation will tend to
have greater autonomous decision-making whereas, a large public corporation

with decentralization policy will tend to have greater joint decision-
making in buying behavior.
Process of Joint Decision-Making
The major thrust of the theory of industrial buying decisions is to
investigate the process of joint decision-making. This includes initiation
of the decision to buy, gathering of information, evaluating alternative
suppliers, and last but not the least, resolving conflict among the
parties who must jointly decide.
The decision to buy is usually initiated by either a continued need
of supply or by the outcome of long-range planning. The formal initiation
in the first case is typically from the production personnel by way of a
requisition slip. The latter usually is a formal recommendation from the
planning unit to an ad hoc committee consisting of the purchasing agent,
the engineer and the plants manager. The information gathering function
is typically relegated to the purchasing agent. If the purchase is a
repetitive decision for standard items, there is very little information
gathering. Usually, the purchasing agent calls up or writes to the
preferred supplier and orders the items on the requisition slip. On
the other hand, considerable active search effort is manifested for
capital expenditure items especially those which are entirely new purchase
experiences for the organization [113,
The most important aspect of joint decision-making process, however,
is the assimilation of information, deliberations on it and the consequent
conflict which entails in most joint decisions. According to March and
Simon [7j, conflict is present when there is a need to decide jointly
among a group of people who have, at the same time, differences in goals
and perceptions. In view of the fact that the latter is invariably present

10
among the three parties to Industrial buying decisions, conflict becomes
a common consequence of joint decision-making process; the buying motives
and the beliefs about the products and suppliers are unfortunately
considerably different between the engineer, the user, and the purchasing
agent partly due to different educational backgrounds and partly due to
company policy of reward for specialized skills and viewpoints.
The interdepartmental conflict is in itself not necessarily bad.
What matters most from the organization's viewpoint is that how it is
resolved. If it is resolved in a rational manner, one very much hopes
that the final joint decision will also tend to be rational. If, on the
other hand, conflict resolution is degenerated in what Strauss [10] calls
tactics of lateral relationship, the organization will suffer from inefficiency
and the joint decisions may be reduced to the process of bargaining and
politiking among the three parties. Not only will the decision be based
on irrational criteria but the choice of a supplier may be to the detriment
of the buying organization.
If the inter-party conflict is largely due to disagreements on beliefs
about the suppliers and their brands, it is likely that the conflict will
be resolved in the problem- solving manner. The immediate consequence of
this type of conflict is to actively search for more information, deliberate
more on available information, and often to seek out other suppliers not
seriously considered before. The additional information is then presented
in a problem-solving fashion so that conflict tends to be minimized.
If the conflict among the three parties is primarily due to the
disagreement on some specific criteria with which to evaluate suppliers,
although, there is an agreement on the buying motives at a more fundamental
level, it is likely to be resolved by persuasion . An attempt is made,
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under this type of resolution, to persuade the dissenting taember by
pointing out the importance of overall corporate objectives and how his
criterion is not likely to attain these objectives. There is no attempt
to gather more information.' However, there results greater interaction
and communication among the parties and sometimes, even an outsider is
brought in to reconcile the differences.
Both problem-solving and persuasion are useful and rational methods,
of conflict resolution. The consequent joint decisions, therefore, tend
also to be more rational. Thus, conflicts produced due to disagreements
on beliefs about the suppliers or on specific criterion are healthy from
the organization's viewpoint even though they may be time consuming. On
the other hand, we are likely tp find a more typical phenomenon in which
conflict arises due to fundamental differences in buying motives among
the three parties. This is especially true with respect to unique and new
buying decisions related to capital expenditure items. The conflict is
resolved not by changing the differences in relative importances of buying
motives of people but by the process of bargaining. The fundamental
differences among the parties are conceded by all the members and the
concept of distributive justice (tit for tat) is invoked as a part of
bargaining. The most usual outcome is to allow a single party to
autonomously decide in this specific situation in return for some favor
or promise about reciprocating in future decisions.
Finally, if the disagreement is not simply with respect to buying
motives but also with respect to style of decision-making, the conflict
tends to be very grave and borders on the mutual dislike of personalities
of the individual decision-makers. The resolution of this type of conflict
is usually by politiking and back stabbing tactics. Unfortunately, it is
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often too common to find such conflict resolutions in industrial buying
decisions. The reader is referred to the sobering research of Strauss
[10, 113 for further discussion.
Of course, bargaining and politiking are non- rational and inefficient
methods of conflict resolution; the. buying organization suffers from these
conflicts. Furthermore , the decicion-nakers ,:ind themselves sinking below
their professional, managerial role. The deciaionn are not only delayed
but tend to be governed by factors other than achieving the corporate
objectives.
SUMMARY
I have attempted in this paper to integrate existing research on
industrial buying decisions by presenting a comprehensive theory of buying
decisions among industrial and other formal organizations. The theory
specifies that the industrial buying decisions are primarily based on
interactions and influences among the purchasing agent, the users and
the engineers. Unfortunately, each party has different objectives in,
and perceptions about, the buying decisions. This often results in
conflict especially when joint decision-making is necessitated. The
conditions under which joint decisions are required are specified in
the theory. Finally, the process of conflict resolution is described
in terms of the March and Simon theory of organizations.
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